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are uncovered: first, nominal prices are typically fixed for more than one year although the time
between changes is very irregular, second, prices change more often during periods of high
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and NBERI. INTRODUCTION
Despite the central importance of the debateinmacroeconomics over whether prices
are flexible, there is very little direct evidence on how actual transaction prices evolve over
time. For instance, in Gordon's [19901 recent survey of "New Keynesian Economics", he is
only able to identify three time series studies on price flexibility. This paper contributes to
the small empirical literature on price rigidity by describing the evolution of prices of twelve
selectedretailgoods overthepast 35 years.
The findings can be summarized in terms of the size, frequencyandsynchronization of
price changes. I uncover three basic facts about these data: first, nominal prices are typically
fixed for more than one year and the time between changes is very inegular second, prices
change more often during periods of high overall inflation; third, when prices do change. the
sizes of the changes are widely dispersed. Both "large" and "small" changes occur for the
same item and the sizes of these changes do not closely depend on overall inflation. These
facts challenge many of the recent theories put forward to explain price rigidities and suggest
certain directions in which to extend existing models.
The remainder of the paper is separated into five sections. In the next section, I
explain why these data are particularly appropriate for testing many of the leading theories of
price rigidity. In the following section, I describe the method of data collection and items in
the study. The fourth section of the paper documents the facts mentioned above. The fifth
section of the paper discusses how these facts bear on the leading theories of price setting.
The final section summarizes my findings and suggests several promising directions for future
research.II The Relevance of Catalog Data
The data were collectedfrom the mail-ordercatalogs of L.L. Bean, Inc., The Orvis
Company, Inc., and Recreational Equipment, Inc. (REI). This section explains why catalog
dataareappropriate for testing many hypotheses about price rigidity.
A.Reasons WhyCatalog PriceMovements areRepresentative
Themost obviousconcern aboutthesedatais thatby theirvery nature,prices
advertisedin catalogs mightbesuspected of beingartificiallymore rigidthan those inretail
stores. Indeed, to beuseful the prices appearing in any given catalog must be applicable over
somenon-trivial timehorizon. Of course, this does not mean that thesamenominalprice
mustbe operativeatalltimes; it wouldbe straightforwardtoindex the pricesinthe catalog.
As a practicalmatter, however,indexprices are rarely used,at leastintheU.S. Thus a key
issue is how much is lost by studying the flexibility of catalog prices.
All three of the companies in this study fix their prices for six month intervals)
Consequently, a maximum of two price changes per year are possible for these data. There
are several reasons that this restriction does not necessarily limit the relevance of these data.
First, Rees [1961] has shown that aside from goods that are rapidlychanging because of
technological improvements, broad movements in catalog prices clOsely track price
movements in conventional retail stores.2 In fact for the six items in this study for which
data are continuously available from 1953 to 1987, aregression of the cumulative change in
catalog prices on the cumulative change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for all urban
consumers yields a coefficient of 1.07 with a standard error of .10. So at lowfrequencies
these prices provide a good indicator of generalprice movements.
2Next, one must ask whether any useful information about higher frequency pricing
patterns can be inferred from these data. Given that firms have the option of resetting the
nominal price twice a year, there is infonuation implicit in the decision not to reset the price.
In other words, if catalog prices track general prices by always changing, but by a different
amount each six months,then thesemi-annual measurement would be particularly limiting.
For all the items in this study there axe sometimes long spells, say longer than four years, of
fixed nominal prices, so the marketing considerations that seem to prevent very high
frequency price revisions do not render these prices uninteresting --particularlyfor students
of business cycles.3
Furthermore, there is an offsetting feature of the mail order business that should work
to make these prices potentially more flexible than other prices that axe often studied. Most
of the existing empirical work on prices focuses on intermediate goods transactions between
buyers and sellers who have long-term relationships. Carlton [1986]. in a careful study of
such transactions, shows that these prices are quite sticky. As he points out, however, this
need not imply any inefficiency because, in this situation, price is only one of the instruments
which can be used to allocate goods. Blinder's [19911 survey results reinforte the view that
this flexibility is important: survey participants often cite the ability to vary the nonprice
attributes of a good as a mason for price rigidity. Since most of the goods in my sample are
quite popular and have been carried by the companies for a long time, stock-outs axe
uncommon and delivery lags are not too variable. This suggests that prices may have to do
more of the work in adjusting to clear these markets than in other situations. In this case, one
might suspect that.these prices might be more flexible than the prices involved in many other
3transactions.
On balance, it seems fair to conclude that although there are some idiosyncracies
associated with catalog prices, in many respects these prices should be representative. More
importantly, there are several specific attributes of the mail order business that make it ideal
for studying the determinants of price rigidity.
B. The Specific Advantages of Catalog Prices
One useful aspect of catalog data is that they allow us to study a particular form of
adjustment costs. Since putting together the layout of a catalog is costly, the catalog
companies necessarily incur some expenses in making the price of their products known. By
the time that the next catalog cycle starts, a finn will have to repay the fixed layout costs if it
wants to change anything about a particular page in the catalog. These costs in no way
depend on the size of any price changes that are made, so that costs of changing the posted
prices are unrelated to the size of any price changes that axe undertaken. This characteristic
of the cataloging business is presumably the reason why Sheshinski and Weiss, in their
classic 1977 article on price setting, motivate their model by describing the pricingproblem
facing a mail-order retailer.
Similarly, because catalog prices can be reset every six months, models emphasizing a
fixed time period between price changes (e.g. Blanchard [1983]) alsoseem to be relevanL So
these data should also be applicable for testing the performance of thetype of fixed timing
models that have often been suggested in the literatureon price rigidity.
Mother motivation for looking at catalog prices is that catalog salesare economically
significant. According to Patterson [1994], United States mail ordercompanies had total sales
4of fifty five billion dollars in 1993 and sales for 1994 were expected to grow by about seven
percent Additionally, since the items in this study axe core business items for the finns,
they all can be purchased in retail stores and for the most part are high volume items. Indeed
the management of one of these companies regularly draws up a formal list of competitors
which includes many non-mail-order firms and checks to see that their own prices are
comparable to this reference group's prices.
Finally, by carefully selecting well-established, popular selling items that have
undergone minimal quality changes it is possible to eliminate some of the noise in prices that
might otherwise be present. For instance, by considering items that are representative of the
finn's product line I can abstract from any pricing behavior that may occur when a firm is
trying to break into a new market Likewise, by studying large revenue items, I insure that
firms have incentives to carefully scrutinize the prices. Also, by studying staple items that
have undergone very little quality change, I can focus on pure pricing behavior.4 Obviously.
these considerations limit the number of goods that can be studied and the types of questions
that can be analyzed. But, on balance, I believe these costs are significantly outweighed by
the benefits of being able to study high quality data on transactions prices.
Ill. DATA COLLECTION AND DESCRIPTION
A.DataCollection
The prices were assembled by directly copying prices from old catalogs. I collected
the information from Bean and Orvis, while the RE data were processed by a member of
their staff. Although these companies issue many catalogs per year, the prices advertised in
5the Spring and Fall catalogs for each company effectively cover the next six months. If an
item does not appear in a particular catalog, the last advertised price was used, which minors
the policy of all three companies to sell an item at its last advertised price if it does not
appear in the current catalog. The majority of the items studied appear in both the Spring
and Fall catalogs each year, so thatempiricallythis issue is not very important5 However,
the Orvis fishing items are often advertised only in the Spring catalog, so that the duration
between price changes for these items must be interpreted appropriately.
A second caveat is that the prices discussed below refer only to the list prices in the
standardcatalogsfor one unit of an item. Hence, I ignore thevery slight discounts for bulk
purchaseswhichhave been offered occasionally by each of the companies. I also ignore sale
prices which may have been available for very short periods. Each of the companies from
time to time offers discounts if an item is over-stocked ora particular model is being
discontinued. Similarly, each of these firmsoperate retail outlets where the goods in the
catalogs can be purchased in person at the catalog prices.' Again, the retail ouUets
sometimes offer short-lived sales that are not available tocatalog customers. For the items in
this study, sales are very infrequent.
In using only stated catalog prices I am alsoignoring any postage and handling
charges. This can be justified for at least three reasons. First,during my sample period all
Bean prices include these charges and the Beanprices can be used to establish essentially all
of the claims made below. Second, the Orvisand EEl prices also apply for goods bought
through their retail stores and as such, dorepresent transaction prices for some customers.
Lastly, Bean management reports that numerouscustomer surveys have indicated that most
6customers are insensitive to shipping charges. This last claim would be interesting to
document and study for its own sake, but it is beyond the scope of this paper.7
RE! is a consumer cooperative, so once per year RE! members are given rebates for
purchases made in the preceding year. The last implication of using stated catalog prices in
my calculations is that [ignore any rebates that members may subsequently receive for
buying through RE!. Since non-members do not receive the rebate and the patterns for the
RE! data axe similar to the Bean and Orvis data, I do not think the presence of the rebates
causes anysignificantbiases.
B.Data Descrintion
TheLL. Bean productsincludetwo shoes, a shirt, a blanket and a duffel bag.
Together these items cover Bean'straditionalproduct areas: footwear, clothing, hunting and
fishing gear and hand-sewncanvasand leather specialty items. Of the two shoes,oneis a
moccasinand the other a huntingboot.The shirt is a cotton "chamois0 shirt. The duffel bag
is made from canvas and the blanket is made of wooL Bean manufactures the duffel bag and
theshoes. The chamoisshirtsarecontracted outandthe manufacturer changes from time to
time. The blanket isa Hudson's Bay BlanketthatBean imports from England. All of these
items are studiedoverthe entire 1953-1987period.'(A more complete description of the
datais givenintheappendix of the1990 working paperversion of the paper.)
The items I track from Orvis reflect the fact that it began as a fishing tackle supplier
and has expanded over the last 25 years to now offer a wider variety of pmducts. The
earliest Orvis items are a bamboo fly rod and a fly. Both are individually made,althoughthe
fly-tying is contracted out and the bamboo rods are made in-house by Orvis craftsmen. The
7popularity of the bamboo rod declined with the invention of graphite, and the rod was
discontinued in 1985. The fly is available over the entire 1953-1987 period? I also analyze
the prices ofa poplin fishinghat that Orvis has sold since 1963.
The non-fishing items have a shorter lifetime. The hunting item that I follow is a pair of
binoculars which Orvis sold from 1966 until 1986. After 1986 the case for these binoculars
waschanged,so I dropped the item. The binocularsare madeforOrvisin West Germany.
The last two Orvis items were selected because of their comparability with Bean goods. I
track the Orvis chamois shirt, which the company introduced in 1974 and the Hudson's Bay
Blanket during the twelve years that Orvis carried it (1972 through 1984). The On'is and
Bean chamois shirts are close substitutes for each other and the Hudson's Bay Blankets that
the two companies offered were identical.
The data from REI were restricted by the availability of past catalogs. Complete catalogs
prior to 1969 were not available. Given that less than 20 years of data were available, I
chose to use only one RE! item: the REI chamois shirt. 'This shirt is manufactured for RE!
and is very similar to the Bean and Orvis shirts.
The products studied are generally well-known, standard items. Given therange of
goods studied, there are bound to be some differences in demand variation and cost
fluctuations, but in many cases these differences can be used to study the implications of
different theories. More importantly, there do notappear to be any strong reasons to believe
that goods' prices should move in unrepresentativeways.
8IV. NOMINAL PRICE CUARACTERISTICS
A. Frequency of Price Changes
Table I introduces the mnemonics used throughout the remainder of the paper and
presents the first main finding: that nominal prices typically stay fixed for periods of longer
than one year —theactual price data are tabulated in the data appendix. As mentioned in the
last section, it is the nature of the catalog business that prices listed in a catalog do not expire
immediately. But there is no a priori reason why price schedules could not be included in the
catalogs. In principle, the schedule could depend on time or more exotic factors such as the
consumer price index. Similarly, the companies could issue catalogs with prices that expired
more frequently (say every three months). However, given conventions followed by these
finns, this fact should be interpreted as saying that over half the time when the firms consider
adjusting their price they choose to leave it alone.
When studying the durations shown in Table lit is important to remember that the
Orvis Fishing Hat and Light Cahill Fly axe often only advertised once per year. More
generally, all the durations depend (slightly) on the way that the truncation associated with
the end of the sample is handled. The statistics on the time between price changes that I
report were calculated using the conservative assumption that all prices prevailing in Fall
1987 would change in the Spring 1988.10 Even so, the average thue between price changes
is about 15 months.
The last four columns in Table I provide further information on the duration of long
spells. These columns reveal that none of the items had their longest spell during the mid- to
late-1970's. This is the first of many indicators that will show that during times of higher
9inflation long spells of constant prices are less common. The table shows that long spells
have not disappeared.Periodsof more than two years of constant prices still occur.
B. The Size of Price Changes
The two panels in Figure 1 give a variety of statistics concerning the size of price
changes. For each item, the top panel shows the average (absolute) size of the price changes.
The lower panel provides information on the distribution of the size of thechanges. For
example, for the Orvis binoculars roughly five percent of the changes were less than one
percent in magnitude, while roughly 14 percent were between one and two percent and
another 14 percent were between two and three percent.. Thus, aboutone third of all of the
changes were less than three percent in magnitude. Conversely, about one fifth of the
changes for the Orvis binoculars were more than 15percent in magnitude.
Overall the heterogeneity in the size of the changes, bothacross dine and items, is
striking. As the top portion of the Figure shows, the meanchange for the different items
varies between 4 and 18 percent, while theaverage over all items is about 8 percent.
However, as the bottom panel shows there are bothlarge and small changes for the same item
at different times. The last bar in the lower half of thefigure shows that across all items, 2.7
percent of the changes are less than one percent in magnitude. Another 7.2percent are
between one and two percent, while 11.1percent axe between two and three percent, so that a
total of 21 percent of the changesare less than three percent in absolute value. Yet, more
than 13 percent of the total changeswere more than 15 percent in magnitude.
The size of the individual pricechanges is not vely closely tied to the overall
(observed) level of inflation: changes aremere frequent during the 1970s but not
10systematically larger when compared to the 1950s, 1960s or late 1980s. One way to
demonstrate this point is to compare the average price change during the 1968 to 1982 period,
when inflation in consumer prices averaged about7.5percent per year, with the average size
of the changes over the pre-1968 and post-1982 period, when average inflation was about 2.5
percent. These statistics are shown iii the fifth andsixthcolumns in Table LI. The numbers
in parentheses below each of the entries in the table represent the number of changes included
in the averages.
For the items that entered the study in the late sixties and early seventies, there is
clearly limited information available concerning pricing patterns in a low-inflation
environment Nevertheless, the table demonstrates that the average magnitude of the price
changes between the two periods is approximately equal. A formal Wilcoxon ranks test for
equality of the median change between the two periods confirms this claim. (I use a non-
parametric test since the distribution of price changes appears to be vety non-normal.) The
last column of Table II shows the probability that the median change in the two periods is
equal. For none of the items is it possible to reject the assumption of.equality at any of the
usual significance levels. For the joint test that the median change across all goods is equal
in the two periods. I fail to reject at the 75 percent significance level.
A different way to see the importance of the variation in the size of the price changes
is to directiy compare the price movements to changes in aggregate inflation. The top half of
Figure II shows a scatter plot of changes in the catalog prices and changes in the Consumer
PriceIndex.For reference, a regression line is also shown. The slope coefficient in the
regression is estimated to be 0.82 (with a standard error of 0.14), although this coefficient
11estimate is strongly influenced by the four large price changes. Absent these four changes of
more than thirty five percent, the slope is estimated to be .68 (with a standard error of .11),
so that one would reject the hypothesis that the coefficient relating the two measures of price
movements is equal to one. In either case, however, the R2 from the regression is around .05,
so that the actual correspondence is very loose.
The lower half of the figure makes a related point by comparing catalog price changes
to movements in the monetary base. Since the money aggregates are not available prior to
1959, this plot excludes the earliest part of the sample, but even so, the fitted regression line
shows thatthemis significant positive association between movements in catalog prices anda
narrow measure of money --theslope of the regression line is estimated to be 0.71 (with a
standarderrorof 0.24). Again, however, the R2 for the equation isvery low (.015), so that
the growthinmoney has relatively little explanatory power for the catalog prices. Put
differently,thepurchasing power of money would vary significantly over time because prices
donotclosely covaiy with the amount of money."
Finally, as is evident from these figures, about eight percent of the price changes (21
of the 261) are negative. Perhaps surprisingly,none of the basic facts about the price changes
appear to be driven by the presence of the price cuts. In particular, the prevalence of the
small changes is not due to price cuts --morethan 20 percent of the price increases are less
than three percent. More generally, theavenge size of the price cuts and price increases are
not noticeably different: the avenge size of the increases is 8.2percent, while the avenge
price cut is 7.4 percent.
12C. 'The Synchronization of Price Changes
Since some theoretical models make predictions regarding the comovements in prices,
I next studythe extent towhich changes across items are synchronized. Figure III shows the
timing of price changes. Each symbol in the figure marks the periods when a price changed.
The figure highlights the fact that price changes were much more frequent from the late
sixties to early eighties; during periods of higher average inflation, price changes were more
common.
The shadinginthe graph shows periods designated as recessions by the National
BureauofEconomicResearch.A first indication of the lack of synchronization of the price
changesis that the frequencyofpricechangesdoesnot appear to depend onthe stage of the
business cycle.Price changes occur about 30 percent of the lime during business cycle
expansions and about 34 percent of thetimeduring business cycle contractions.
It is difficulttomore precisely characterize thesynchronization of thechanges
because,given the discretenawit of changes, standard correlation statistics are uninformative.
Accordingly.I use a measure of associationthat accountsfor this discontinuity(see Fleiss
[1973]pp. 42-43). Intuitively, this association measureis derived bycheckingwhether
changes and non-changesforone series are sufficientlyalignedwith changes and non-changes
for thesecond seriesso as to reject thehypothesisthat the two sequences of changes are
independent. Therefore,inadditionto providing ameasureofassociationthatis scaled
between -1 and 1, thestatisticalsofacilitatestesting whether price changesforany pairof
seriesareindependent. I viewlack ofindependenceas a very weak benchmark since with
semi-annualdataI would expect business cycle factors to induce some commonmovements
13across most items.
Surprisingly, using the changes of the raw, semi-annual data it is not possible to reject
the hypothesis of independence among most of the series--only 12 of the 66 pairwise
comparisons were sufficiently correlated so that the hypothesis of independence could be
rejected. (To save space these results are omitted). One possible explanation for this may be
that changes axe indeed synchronized but not contemporaneously timed; for instance, changes
for similar items may regularly occur within a year but not coincide exactly. Moreover, for
some of the more seasonal goods, comparisons using semi-annual data may be slightly
misleading.
To investigate these possibilities, I annualized the data so that changes that occur
within the same year will be treated as identical çi.e., if any price change occurred within a
given year. the observation for the year is coded as a one, otherwise it is coded as zero.)
Since there are two ways to group adjacent Fall and Spring seasons, I used two different
definitions of a year one corresponding to the standard calendaryear, the other corresponding
to the fashion cycle that fins from Fall of one year through Spring of the nextyear. Using
the calendar year convention there are nine significant associations between the 66pairwise
comparisons, while there are only six significant associations using the fashionyear dating.
In some cases, the short length of the sample and the associated lack ofprecision may
be responsible for the insignificance of the correlations. However, the lack of
synchronization is also evident for many of the items where synchronization might have been
most expected. For example, one cannot reject the hypothesis that theprice changes for the
identical blankets being sold by Orvis and Beanare independent. The same conclusion
14follows for the associations among the three chamois shirts and for the connections between
the fishing gear. Collectively, these results suggest that there is very little synchronization
between the price changes across items.'2
At this point I have established the three main facts mentioned in the introduction:
prices are adjusted infrequently, by differing amounts, and, although prices are more likely to
change duringperiods of high overall inflation,the synchronization of changes across goods
is generally low. These findings should not be surprising since they are implicit in the only
other empirical work using U. S. data, Cecchetti [1985, 19861--although Cecchetti did not
emphasize the presence of many small changes.'3 His results are for magazine newsstand
prices,whichsome skeptics have argued may be atypical because subscriptions and
advertising, not newsstand sales, produce the majority of magazine revenue and magazines on
the whole are a small ticket item. My data are immune to these criticisms and reaffirm
Cecchetti's findings)4
V. INTERPRETING THE FACTS USING EXISTING MODflS
One difficulty in trying to explain these facts is that there is no consensus, baseline
model from which to start. Instead the literature has bifurcated so that most papers focus
either on time-dependent price-setting rules or state-dependent price- setting rules.
Unfortunately, neither of these lines of the literature convincingly explains the failure
of firms to index their prices.LS The standard reply to concerns over why sophisticated rules
are not used is that the cost to a monopoListically competitive firm of a slightly miss-set price
is second-order (see Mankiw [1985] and Akerlof and Yellen (1985].) So, if there are small
15relabelling or "menu" costs involved in revising prices they may be enough to inhibit
continuousadjustment of prices.While this explanation is appealing, the difficulty of
identifying these menu costs (or in Akerlof and Yellen's terms, explaining why nominal rules
of thumb dominate simple indexing schemes) is still disturbing. Both time dependent and
state dependentmodels aretherefore incomplete, but both approaches can explain why other
types of pricing decisions are not made continuously.
A. Assessing Time-DependentPricing Models
One classofexplanationsfor whypricesare notcontinuouslyreset presumes that
either the necessary information is not availableorthat the costs of high frequency changes
are prohibitive (see Blanchard il93]-)Thesemodels posit instead that price setters will
intervene to change prices only occasionally when the relevant information has become
available. This argument is somewhat appealing because these companies are now issuing so
many catalogs per year (Bean was sending out over 20 per year by the end of the sample)
that it would be unrealistic to assume that prices could be intelligently readjusted with each
catalog. Aside from the confusion it would create for customers, it is. probably difficult to
process sales data quickly enough to justify continually fme-tuning prices. Although this
model explains why prices are posted for non-trivial periods of time, it doesnot explain why
the actual period of time between changes for thesame good is so variable. The large
standard deviations for the number of months between pricechanges cannot be explained by
simple timing models.
A more sophisticated timing-based model would relax theassumption that all prices
for every item are revised in tandem, Instead,an extended model would focus on the extent
16to which price changes could be related to the (potentially lumpy) arrival of information. In
particular, a robust implication of the timing model is that if two items have similar cost or
demand characteristics, so that information arrival for the goods is highly correlated, then
price changesforthe two items should be correlated. In my sample there are four natural
groupings of items where these conditions are likely to hold: the two identical blankets, the
three nearly identical shirts, the two types of leather shoes, and the three fishing items. As
mentioned in the last section, it does not appear that changes among these goods are tightly
synchronized even at the annual frequency. Only for the two types of shoes is it possible to
reject the hypothesis that the price changes am independent.
The asynchronization of the changes is even more surprising given that the price levels
for comparable items tend to be aligned. For instance, the Orvis price-setters told me that
they were matching Bean's price moves for the Hudson Bay blankets. While it is true that
the price levels are fairly close, a comparison of the sequence of price changes turns up some
unexpected patterns. For instance, between the Spring of 1980 and the Fall of 1982, the
prices for the blankets were:
1980 1981 1982
SpringFallSpring FallSpringFall
Bean$110 $111$112 $131 $132 $145
Orvis $110$110$131 $136 $136 $136
AftertheFall of 1982, die Bean price remained at $145 for another 18 months, while Orvis
held its price at$136 for another twoyears.Clearly this sequence of changes will be
difficultto explain using a standard timing model. More generally, aside from the fact that
17prices sometimes do not change. I find little support for the dining models.
B. Assessing State-DependentPricinE Models
The leading alternative explanation for why firms do not continuously adjust prices
posits that, because price adjustment is costly, a firm trades off the costs of letting inflation
erode its optimal price with the cost of changing prices. With a fixed cost of changing prices
and a predictable ambunt of inflation, the finn will not adjust its nominal prices until the
accumulated inflation drives the ma! price below a (pie-specified) lower limiL Once the limit
is crossed, the nominal price will be reset to a higher level. Allowing for cost and demand
shocks implies that nominal prices should be set to be keep the real price within a band that
varies over time.
The usual motivation for these type of models is that they are plausible and sometimes
even optimal (depending on the exact specification of the model). Not surprisingly, as with
the simple timing models, the versions of this model that rely on a constant fixed cost of
changing prices fail to describe many key features of the data. For instance, not only do
nominal prices both rise and fall, but the presence ofmany small price increases suggests that
the band widths are highly variable. Similarly, as Tsiddon [1991] shows, whenexpected
inflation increases, the avenge size of price changes should increase becausea finn would
want to trade off the frequency of costly price changes with the deviation of the actualprice
from the target price. As shown in Table 11, there isno evidence that the size of prices is
closely related to the level of inflation.
There are several ways to extend the state-dependent models that wouldhelp address
these problems, One possibility is to assumt that demand conditionsshift to make the
18desired band width narrower, so that an immediate small price change has a large benefit
Alternatively, the variations in the sizes of the price changes could be handled by introducing
a time-varying cost to changing prices.
These approaches are just beginning to be pursued. For instance, Benabou [19921,
expanding on his 1988 model, shows how consumers' seazvh behavior can interact with the
level of inflation to generate endogenous fluctuations in the degree of competitiveness. In his
model, shocks that increase competition decrease price dispersion and thus can generate a
motive for small price adjustments, even at high levels of inflation. Unfortunately, the
Benabou model is sufficiently complex that it can only be analyzed using simulations;
"testing" the model does not seem possible at this point
Caballero and Engel [1994] propose a related set of models, including one where the
cost of changing prices is explicitly modelled as a random variable. In this case, a Sheshinski
and Weiss style policy, in which firms take no action until a threshold is crossed and then act
for sure once the bather is passed, is no longer optimal. Instead, firms will have a
continuous probability of adjusting their prices and the probability of adjusting will rise as the
distance between the optimal price and the actual price increases. Intuitively, this type of
policy will generate both large and small changes because if the costs of changing prices axe
sometimes low, then firms will occasionally make a small price adjustment.
The principal implication of this class of models is that large divergences between the
actual price and the desired price axe much less likely to be optimal than small divergences.
Accordingly, shocks that engender large divergences will generally be offset by price
changes, so that large price changes should be more common than small adjustments --the
19distribution of price changes should be fat-tailed.
The (excess) kurtosis of the price changes in this sample is 31.02. Interestingly, the
kurtosis of the price increases is 31.23, while the kurtosis of the price cuts is 4.58. These
differences are also predicted by the theory since the general drift in inflation should make
large price cuts less necessary than large price increases. Thus, simple calculations suggest
that this new class of models is very promising.
C. Assessing a New Customer-Based Model of Pricing
The last explanation I consider was proposed by the price-setters at Orvis and REI.
They suggested that them are certain nominal thresholds, price points", which firms are
reluctant to exceed because doing so would lead to a considerable loss in sales. More
formally, a price point is a price where a firm believes its marginal revenue curve is
discontinuous because its customers care about nominal magnitudes. This explanation is
different from the standard kinked demand explanation of price stickiness. The firmmay be
reluctant to exceed a threshold even if there is no strong competition. For instance, fora
monopolist, a price increase from 19.95 to 20.30 might have a very different effect than an
increase from 20.50 to 20.85. The presence of a competitor is likely only to reinforcea
firm's reluctance to change a price.
Them is no tight theoretical justification for thisstory, although it is essentially similar to
the explanation for rigidities posited by McCallum [1986]. McCallumsuggested that the use
of non-indexed prices is done for convenience. Heargues that inflation uncertainty in the
United States has generally been low, so that thegains from indexation would be low enough
that the mere cost of continuallycalculating real prices is sufficient to deter firms from
20indexing. The analogy is that buyers may use rules of thumb when searching for items and
comparing prices. McCallum's convenience argument can be used to explain why the rules
would likely be formulated using nominal prices, If firms are aware of this tendency by
consumers they may set prices so as to exploit the use of the rules; if a finn knows some
customers do not even consider buying a shirt that costs more than $20, then the firm will
prefer to charge $19.95 instead of $20.05.
The RET and Orvis price setters do not appear to be the only retail finns that believe
that price points are important. For instance, in his recent survey of finns pricingbehavior
Alan Blinder asked firms to assess the importance of this phenomena. Among the seventeen
retail finns he sampled, the price point theory received considerable support. For instance,
fifteen of the seventeen firms report that they believe their customers are affected by price
points.
Thus, the natural question is whether standard statistical tests can be used to
determine their relevance for price rigidity. In a previous version of the paper, Kashyap
[1990), I provided a number of calculations to assess this question. The results were mixed
and for brevity's sake, I merely summarize the main findings. First, the static distribution of
prices is not uniform. Prices ending between 41 to 50 cents or 75 to 00 cents are much morn
common than prices ending between 01 to 40 or 51 to 74. ('This is a widely documented
finding, see Friedman [1967].) The bunching of price endings is more pronounced during
low inflation periods than high inflation periods. These facts about the static distribution,
however, are irrelevant for niacroeconomists unless they have dynamic implications.
To investigate the dynamic consequences of the price points, one needs to be more
21specific abouthow to define, a price point. This' is difficult since there is clear danger of
circularityinusingthedatatolearnaboutthepricepointsandthentestingthemodelwiththe
samedata. Ideally, one would use different data sets to identify the price points and to study
their consequences. With only one data set and a presumption that the high and low inflation
periodsmay differ, the options here are limited. My approach was to use very simple rules to
identify the price points, with the hope that these rules were sufficiently straightforward that it
would be clear that the results have not been rigged.
The niles I adopted create thresholds every fifty cents for the low price items (the hat
and the shoe) and every dollar for the more expensive items." Operationally, this meant
that prices in certain ranges were considered to be at price points. The dollar price point
encompasses only those prices that end between 75 and 100 cents. The fifty cent price range
was defined to include this range as well as prices which end between 40 and 50 cents. For
instance, prices of $12.45 and $7.95 would both considered to be at a fifty cent threshold.
Given these admittedly ad hoc cutoffs several tests were carried out (See Kashyap 119901 for
a more extended discussion of what follows).
First, if pricing points inhibit price changes, then they might also be expected to affect
the sizes of price increases. Specifically, if prices that are atprice points are fixed longer
than other prices, then any subsequent price adjustmentsmight be expected to be larger than
avenge. There was weak evidence in this direction. On an item by item basis there was a
slight tendency for the changes after price points to be larger (but not significantly so) than
usual. Collectively, across all items thispattern was statistically significant.
A more direct test I considered was to check whether aftercontrolling for competitors'
22price movements and cost shocks, price changes were less likely to occur when prices were
near price points. To do this,I estimatedthe probability of a price change given proxies for
costchanges and movements incompetitors' prices, as well as an indicator of whether the
firm was near apricepoinL
The models successfully predict the decision tochange ornot roughly 70 percent of
the time. The coefficients onthecost proxies tended to be positive and marginally
significant. indicating that an increase in costs increases the likelihood of a price change.
Conversely,for seven of the eight items, the price points indicators have negative coefficients
--althoughonly one of the eight coefficients had a t-statistic greater than 1.67 in absolute
value (the ten pement significance level). The cumulative increases in the price of substitute
goods, over the period when a firm has its own price fixed, seemed to have a mixed effect on
the likelihood of a price change--with the only significant results coming for the shirts. Thus,
although the price points seemed to work in the expected direction most of the coefficient
estimates were insignificanL
This conclusion was partially reversed when I allowed the importance of the price
point effects to shift with the level of inflation. Specifically, I split up the price threshold
proxy so that there were separate regressors for the high and low inflation regimes." The
period 1968-1982 was chosen as the high inflation period (and the results were not sensitive
to use of these specific dates). The results were then somewhat more impressive: for all of
the goods, being near a price point in the low inflation period reduced the probability of a
price change, while in most cases price points were of no importance during the high inflation
period. Furthermore, the importance of th. price points was much more pronounced for the
23shirts, cap and fly --thecoefficients on the price point indicators during low inflation periods
for four of these five items had I-statistics above 1.5. It appears thai the designation of price
points that I used for the three $40÷ items was too loose. The data suggest that adjacent one
dollar bathers are not nearly as important for these more expensive items.
The overall evidence on price points suggests that they may influence price
adjustment, but this data set is not very well suited to establishing their importance. A study
focusing on morn goods even over a much shorter period would have much more power to
determine the significance of the price points.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The results in section IV show that nominal prices sometimes stay fixed for several
years and at other times change regularly every six months. When prices do change, the size
of the price changes are quite different and in particulaç small price changes are quite
common. The combination of many periods of no change and many small changes suggests
that when small price changes do occur, the costs of changing prices must be small (or the
benefits of the change must be large). At other times these costs must belarger or benefits
must be smailer. Models that generate price rigidity by assuming a constant cost of changing
prices in an otherwise stationary environment cannot explain these data.
Models that assume that the costs of changing prices axe lime varyingmay be able to
explain these data. While these models axe becoming easier to work with, they do not
explain why these costs exist in the first place. Is this an important question? Ball and
Mankiw[1994] have recentlyargued that macroeconomists should not be too worried about
24using "menu cost models without having a literal account of menu costs" 1 disagree. For
instance, a leadingexplanationfor the true costs of adjustment is the cost of managers' time
(e.g.Balland Mankiw). If this is correct, automated pricing decisionsshouldbecome much
morecommon with increased computerization. It is quite possible that automatic indexing
provisions will gain popularity. It is important to determine whether such changes will have
a large impact on the extent to which prices are sticky. More generally, them was one
episode in my sample --thelate l9lOs --whencatalog companies significantly increased the
frequency of their prices changes. Without knowing what led to this shift, the robustness of
the shortcuts that must be taken to keep models tractable seems questionable.
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281. One interesting question that I do not swdyiswhythecompanies choose this particular
interval over which to quote fixed nominal prices.
2. Specifically, he shows that a consumer price index based on a collection of catalog items
closely tracks the Bureau of Labor Statistics' official consumer price index, as long as the goods
are not undergoing big changes in quality.
3. See Barsky and Warner [1994] for a study of high frequency pricing patterns.
4. Of course not changing quality may be an endogenous decision. Implicitly I assume that
for these goods, quality changes are driven by exogenous forces.
5. if a customer uses an old catalog to place an order, all three companies fill the order and
bill the customer for the current price.
6. The equivalence between the store and catalog prices is reassuring since Orvis and REI
are expanding the number of outlets they operate and thus the percentage of total sales accruing
from catalogs is falling. At the end of my sample, mail order sales accounted for over 80 percent
of Bean's and Orvis's total sales and roughly 20 percent of REI's total sales.
7. In the early 1990s Bean changed its policy and began adding a shipping charge.
8. The price of each of these items except the duffle bag changed in the first half of 1953 -
- theduffle bag price had been at $7.85 since the first half of 1951. I limit my analysis to the
post-Korean war period because of the price controls and rationing that prevailed during the
Korean War and World War IL In many cases, goods completely disappeared from the market.
In other cases, quantities were limited and often only available if the buyer had a ration coupon.
9. Unlike the bamboo rod, the fly's price did not change in the first half of 1953. So in
Table 1, I account for the fact that the price of the fly was 42 cents from 1949 through the
Spring of 1954.
10.Dropping the last spell for each item gives very similar answers --exceptfor the Orvis
chamois shirt which had not had a price change since the second half of 1983.
11.The link between money and prices is even looser if one uses M2 as the measure of
money. In this case, the regression line has a slope of .01 (with a standard error of .18) and R2
for the regression is only .00001.
2912.Lach and Tsiddon [1992] report that price changes across a set of grocery goods in Israel
between 1978 and 1984 are not very closely synchronized. Tominasi [1993] also reaches this
conclusion after studying weekly supermarket prices of 15 goods in Argentina in 1990. So even
across very different inflation regimes there seems to be little synchronization of price changes.
13.Danziger [1987) analyzes Israeli data for Kosher salami. However, his data are not
continuously sampled through time or across sellers. Sheshinski, Tishler and Weiss [1981) study
thepriceof noodles and instant coffee in Israel but these prices are regulated. Lach and Tsiddon
[1992]and Tommasi [1993] examine prices from economies with much higher rates of inflation
than the United States. Barsky and Warner [1994] have recently collected daily transactions
prices for a number of retail goods sold at several stores, buttheir samplecovers only a few
months.
14.See Weiss [1993] for a comprehensive survey of how these findings compare to results
from studies using data from other countries.
15.As Ball and Romer [1990] and McCallum [1986] emphasize, many of the commonly cited
reasons for price rigidity are in fact reasons formal rather than nominal price rigidity. Moreover,
Bail and Romer showthat onlya small amount of nominal rigidity can have large effects if real
prices are rigid.
16.Some of the items were excluded because cost proxies could not be found. For instance,
no reliableproducerpriceindicesare available for bamboo and it is known that bamboo
shortages have been a key factor in shifting the price of the fly rod.. Similarly cost information
is difficult to obtain for thebinoculars.Since the binoculars have always been produced by a
single West German finn, I suspect that approximating costs for this item may be particularly
difficult. Finally, for the blankets (British) labor cost data were not readily available. In thecase
of the blankets, we have already see that competitive factors arevery important and that the price
point story may not be relevant.
17.Making this type of distinction can be justified for several reasons. First, consumer search
activity, which undoubtedly influences these thresholds, is unlikely to be constant. Pursuing the
analogy with the McCallum explanation, if rules of thumb are responsible for thresholds then
rules of thumb may be abandoned during periods of high inflation.Similarly, changes in the
sizes of cost shocks could undermine the importance ofprice points. If costs grow more rapidly
during periods of high inflation, then retailers may choose to jump from price point to price
point Finally, because prices are adjusted more frequently during periods of high inflation, a
firm might expect its competitors tobemore inclined to follow a price move. Hence, strategic





between price Overall: since1960:
changes
& NuiterofDates &duration DatesI.duration
Mnemonic Item Dates (Std. 0ev.) changes (months) (months)
Bean
1.1.5_ShoeHunting53:1—87:2 11.8 36 59:2—63:2 51 85:2—86:2 18
shoe (10.9)
Bean
ut.a..socccamp 53:1—87:211.5 37 59:2—65:176 81:1—82:1 18
Moccasin (12.8)
Bean












LLB_ShrtChamois53:1—87:2 12.5 34 59:1—65:2 84 85:1—87:1 30
Shirt (14.2)
Orvis
oRV_Shrt chamois74:2—87:2 14.7 11 83:2—87:2 54 83:2—87:2 54
Shirt (14.3)
RET
ReI_shrt Chamois72:1—87:2 14.8 13 81:1—97:1 78 81:1—87:1 78
Shirt (19.7)
orvis
0KV_Hat Fishing63:1-87:2 18.8 16 63:1—68:2 72 81:1—82:2 24
Hat (15.0)
orvis
ORV.BrodBamboo 53:1—85:1 18.0 22 69:2—73:2 54 81:1—82:1 18
Fly Rod (14.9)
Orvis
0KV_Fly Fishing53:1—87:2 30.4 14 54:1—64:2 132 92:1—84:2 36
Fly (31.6)
Orvis
0KV_Binc 7 inch 66:1—86:1 11.2 22 68:1—71:1 42 80:1—81:224
Binocs. (9.1)
All Items 53:1—87:2 14.7 273
(15.0)
3'Table II








Complete period period Probability of
sample (1968-1982)pre—68, po.t-82equal medians
HnejuonicItem Dates (0 Changes) (I Changes) (I Changes)
Bean
LLB_ShoeHunting53:1—87:2 5.5 4.9 6.4 0.18
Shoe (35) (21) (14)
Bean
LLB_$oCcCamp 53:1—87:2 5.7 5.4 6.4 0.72
Moccasin (36) (23) (13)
Bean
LLB_BlnkHudson 53:1—87:2 9.0 11.9 5.4 0.34
Bay (23) (13) (10)
Blanket
Orvis




LL8_DbagZIpper 53:1—87:2 7.1 6.6 7.6 0.7$
Duffle (32) (17) (15)
Bag
Bean
t.LB_Shrtchamois531—87:2 4.8 5.1 4.4 0.89
Shirt (33) (22) (11)
Orvis
ORV_ShrtChamois74:2—87:2 5.3 5.0 8.0 n.a. ShIrt (13) (9) Ci)
REI
-
REX_SlutChamois72:1-81:2 10.0 10.0 10.0 n.e.
Shirt (12) (11) (1)
Orvis
ORV_Hac Fishing63:1—81:2 17.1 18.2 14.0 0.99
Hat (15) (11) (4)
Orvis
o?V_BrodBamboo 53,1—85:1 11.1 13.2 9.8 0.48
Fly Rod (21) (12) (9)
Orvis
CRY_FLy Fishing 53:1—87:2 10.3 9.9 11.3 0.82
Fly (13) (9) (4)
Orvis
ORV_Binc7 inch 66:1-86:1 8.4 7.6 11.2 0.15
Binocs. (21) (16) (5)
All *11 Items53:1-872 8.1 8.4 7.5 0.75
(261) (174) (87)
32Catalog PriceData
(SeeTable Ifor Mnemonicsand footnotes8and 9 (or informalion usedinTable 1 calculations.)
DateOEM_BradORV_BiflC LLB_Blnk ORV_Blnk LLB_$occ LLB_Shoe
531 86.50 . 28.65 . 5.85 10.85
532 86.50 . 28.65 . 5.85 10.85
54 1 86.50 . 28.65 . 5.85 11.85
542 86.50 . 28.65 . 5.85 11.85
55 1 86.50 . 28.65 . 5.85 11.85
552 86.50 . 28.85 . 5.85 11.85
56 1 90.00 . 29.85 . 6.45 12.85
562 90.00 . 29.85 . 6.45 12.85
57 1 90.00 . 29.85 . 6.45 12.85
57 2 90.00 . 29.85 . 6.45 12.85
58 1 90.00 . 30.85 . 6.55 12.85
582 90.00 . 30.85 . 6.55 12.85
59 1 98.50 . 30.85 . 6.75 12.85
59 2 98.50 . 30.85 . 7.75 13.35
60 1 98.50 . 30.85 . 7.75 13.35
602 98.50 . 30.85 . 7.75 13.35
61 1 98.50 . 30.85 . 7.75 13.35
612 98.50 . 30.85 . 7.75 13.35
62 1 98.50 . 30.85 . 7.75 13.35
622 98.50 . 30.85 . 7.75 13.35
63 1106.50 . 32.85 . 7.75 13.35
632 106.50 . 32.85 . 7.75 13.35
64 1106.50 . 32.85 . 7.75 13.85
64 2106.50 . 33.85 . 7.75 13.85
65 1106.50 . 33.85 . 7.75 14.85
65 2106.50 . 33.85 . 7.75 14.85
66 1120.00 92.50 33.85 . 9.00 14.85
662 120.00 92.50 35.00 . 9.25 15.85
67 1120.00 92.50 36.00 . 9.45 18.35
67 2120.00 92.50 36.00 . 9.45 18.35
68 1135.00 97.50 36.00 . 9.75 19.00
68 2135.00 97.50 36.00 . 9.85 19.00
69 1135.00 97.50 36.00 . 10.00 19.00
69 2150.00 97.50 37.00 . 10.50 19.00
70 1150.00 97.50 37.00 . 10.75 19.85
70 2150.00 97.50 37.00 . 11.00 20.00
71 1150.00 97.50 37.00 . 11.50 20.50
71 2150.00 107.00 37.00 . 11.50 22.00
72 1150.00 107.00 37.00 39.50 11.90 22.00
72 2150.00 107.00 37.00 39.50 13.00 22.00
73 1150.00 110.00 45.00 39.50 13.50 22.00
73 2 150.00 110.00 45.00 55.00 13.50 22.00
74 1165.00 120.00 45.00 55.00 13.75 23.50
74 2 245.00 154.50 65.00 67.50 14.00 25.00
75 1245.00 159.75 65.00 67.50 14.50 26.50
75 2 245.00 162.75 65.00 69.75 15.00 27.00
33Date ORV_Brod ORV_BiflC LLB_Blnk ORV_Blnk LL.3_Mocc LLB_Shoe
76 1245.00 177.75 65.00 69.75 16.50 27.50
76 2257.00 172.75 65.00 69.75 16.50 29.00
77 1257.00 177.75 65.00 69.75 17.50 29.00
77 2270.00 187.50 72.00 77.00 18.00 30.00
78 1270.00 191.00 86.00 91.00 18.00 31.00
78 2288.00 193.00 86.00 92.00 19.50 33.00
79 1288.00 230.00 88.50 92.00 21.00 36.00
79 2330.00 230.00 97.00 98.50 25.00 41.00
80 1380.00 269.50 110.00 110.00 27.75 41.00
802 420.00 269.50 111.00 110.00 27.75 42.75
81 1460.00 269.50 112.00 131.00 29.75 41.75
81 2 505.00 269.50 131.00 136.00 29.75 42.50
82 1505.00 269.00 132.00 136.00 29.75 45.25
82 2505.00 269.00 145.00 136.00 31.00 47.75
83 1550.00 269.00 145.00 136.00 32.75 49.75
83 2550.00 250.00 145.00 136.00 32.75 49.75 84 1605.00 260.00 145.00 136.00 33.75 51.25
84 2 695.00 225.00 120.00 136.00 35.75 48.75
85 1800.00 225.00 120.00 . 35.75 52.75
85 2 . 195.00 120.00 . 37.75 53.00
86 1 . 230.00 120.00 . 37.75 53.00
86 2 . . 120.00 . 37.75 53.00
871 . . 120.00 . 38.50 55.00
872 . . 109.00 . 38.50 55.00
Date ORV_CapORV_$hrt REI_Shrt LLB_Shrt LLB_Dbag ORV_Fly
531 . . . 5.45 7.85 0.42 53 2 . . . 5.45 7.85 0.42 54 1 . . . 5.45 7.85 0.50 54 2 . . . 5.15 7.75 0.50 55 1 . . . 5.15 8.65 0.50 55 2 . . . 5.15 8.65 0.50 56 1 . . 5.35 8.85 0.50 56 2 . . . 5.35 8.85 0.50 57 1 . . . 5.65 10.90 0.50 57 2 . . . 5.65 10.90 0.50 58 1 . . . 5.65 10.90 0.50 58 2 . . . 5.65 10.90 0.50 59 1 . . . 5.85 10.90 0.50 59 2 . . . 5.85 11.90 0.50 60 1 . . . 5.85 11.90 0.50 60 2 . . . 5.85 11.90 0.50 61 1 . . . 5.85 11.90 0.50 61 2 . . . 5.85 12.85 0.50 62 1 . . . 5.85 12.85 0.50
622 . . . 5.85 12.85 0.50
631 2.50 . . 5.85 12.85 0.50
34DateORV_CapORV_Shrt REI_Shrt LLB_Shrt LLB_Dbag ORV_Fly
63 2 2.50 . . 5.85 12.85 0.50
64 1 2.50 . . 5.85 12.85 0.50
642 2.50 . . 5.85 12.85 0.50
Ss 1 2.50 . . 5.85 12.85 0.55
65 2 2.50 . . 5.85 11.65 0.55
66 1 2.50 . . 6.25 11.65 0.55
66 2 2.50 - . 6.25 11.65 0.55
67 1 2.50 . . 6.45 14.50 0.60
67 2 2.50 . . 6.45 14.50 0.60
68 1 2.50 . . 6.85 14.00 0.65
68 2 2.50 . . 6.85 14.00 0.65
691 2.95 . . 7.00 14.00 0.65
69 2 2.95 . . 7.50 14.00 0.65
70 1 2.95 . . 7.85 14.00 0.75
70 2 2.95 . . 8.00 14.50 0.75
71 1 5.50 . . 8.35 14.50 0.75
71 2 5.50 . 8.50 14.50 0.75
72 1 6.50 . 8.50 8.35 14.50 0.75
72 2 6.50 . 8.50 8.35 15.00 0.75
73 1 7.50 . 11.00 8.35 15.00 0.75
73 2 7.50 . 11.00 8.85 15.50 0.75
74 1 7.50 . 14.25 10.00 16.50 0.80
74 2 7.75 17.00 14.25 12.00 16.50 0.80
75 1 7.75 17.95 14.25 12.50 17.00 0.90
75 2 7.75 17.50 14.25 12.50 17.00 0.90
76 1 7.95 17.50 14.75 12.50 18.50 0.90
76 2 7.95 17.95 14.75 12.50 20.50 0.90
77 1 8.75 17.95 15.95 13.00 22.00 0.90
77 2 8.75 18.50 16.95 13.00 23.00 0.90
78 1 9.95 19.50 17.95 13.50 23.00 1.00
78 2 9.95 19.50 17.95 13.50 23.50 1.00
79 110.45 19.50 19.00 14.00 24.00 1.10
79 210.45 19.95 19.50 14.25 27.00 1.10
80 112.50 20.95 17.95 14.75 32.00 1.20
80 212.50 20.95 19.50 15.75 29.75 1.20
81 113.50 22.50 19.95 16.50 29.75 1.30
81 213.50 24.95 19.95 17.00 29.75 1.30
82 113.50 24.95 19.95 17.50 31.50 1.40
82 213.50 24.95 19.95 18.25 34.25 1.40
83 115.00 24.95 19,95 19.00 35.25 1.40
83 215.00 22.95 19,95 t9.75 35.25 1.40
84 116.75 22.95 19.95 19.75 36.00 1.40
84 216.75 22.95 19.95 19.75 38.00 1.40
85 117.50 22.95 19.95 21.00 36.00 1.50
85 217.50 22.95 1995 21.00 36.00 1.50
86 117.50 22.95 19.95 21.00 38.00 1.50
86 217.50 22.95 19.95 21.00 38.00 1.50
87 112.50 22.95 19.95 21.00 39.00 1.50











Figure IA Sizes of Price Changes
Average Abeolute Percent Changes
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Figure IS Distributionof Price ChangesFigure hA
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